This article considers a common misunderstanding of Rene Girard’s mimetic theory, particularly the scapegoating mechanism.
Listen to this example:
A conversation between Jonathan Pageau & Fr. Joseph Lucas
Pageau compares the Biblical scapegoat (Leviticus 16) with Girard’s scapegoating mechanism and observes that another sacrifice was offered up, which is not the scapegoat. Based on that, he concludes that Girard only sees half the picture.
In another interview with Luke Burgis, Pageau reiterates this view, and rather surprisingly, Burgis sees nothing wrong with the view and supports it by saying: “Girard identifies a particular kind of sacrifice.” https://youtu.be/zARN5r_x2KM?si=oEspQcH4Y3PLBB5u
I think this is a fundamental misunderstanding. Girard’s scapegoating mechanism is not a ritual, it’s not a sacrifice, rather, it’s a process that lays a foundation from which these phenomena develop. Part of the misunderstanding has to do with the terminology of scapegoating and the concepts they represent from a theological perspective and from a Girardian, anthropological perspective.
The semantic history of the word scapegoat.
The Oxford English Dictionary tells us the word “scapegoat” was coined by William Tyndale for his 1530 translation of the Bible. It names “one of two goats that was chosen by lot to be sent alive into the wilderness, the sins of the people having been symbolically laid upon it.”
It simply referred to the goat that escaped – thus the scapegoat.
This earliest use of the word describes a Levitical ritual. There is no punitive meaning to it. David Dawson, in his book Flesh Becomes Word, says the following about the semantic history of the word:
it begins life as a ritual animal, spends sixteen centuries as a Christian typology, and ultimately wanders into the vernacular as an expression whose popularity and breadth of application quickly surpass that of its primary meaning. Then there is the question of its earliest metaphorical uses. One dictionary notes that “the history of the biblical scapegoat in English literature following Tyndale’s translation is virtually a blank page” and that the word “has almost entirely lost the force of biblical association by the Victorian period” and so “tends merely to indicate a person, group, or thing that bears the blame for others.”[1]
And so Dawson’s aim with that book is to examine “How does the goat that got away become a signifier of vicarious punishment?
The history of the development of the scapegoat idea within Christian typology is complex and fascinating. Even before we bring Girard’s ideas into the conversation the scapegoat embodies a complex history. But that is beyond the scope of what I want to do here. If you are interested in that, get Dawson’s book.
It’s obvious that Pageau and others begin from this theological/biblical perspective of the scapegoat and then try to work out if Girard has anything useful to add with his scapegoating mechanism, assuming that his idea maps onto the Levitical scapegoat because it shares a term in common. That’s a misunderstanding.
Girardian Scapegoating Mechanism
Girard did not begin from this Biblical perspective of the Levitical scapegoat. His idea has its birth in the events prior to ritual and sacrifice.[2] In fact, prior to humans! So, Girard is not even imagining how religious humans invented a particular kind of sacrifice, as Luke Burgis suggests. No, Girard is exploring the process that made us human. He is careful to note that this process does not refer to any one particular event, or one kind of sacrifice, but rather identifies a general pattern that lays a foundation for all kinds of sacrifice. In addition, Girard is adamant that the process is unconscious.
Let me reiterate: Girard identifies an unconscious, spontaneous general pattern of events that were instrumental in the evolution of hominids becoming human. I hope it is clear by now that when we consider the concept within its narrative sequence, we are nowhere near the Yom Kippur scapegoat ritual of Leviticus 16.
Let me give a short (not comprehensive) description of the events. In primitive communities where there are no prohibitions against violence, an outbreak of violence would easily escalate. (Another aspect of Mimetic theory is mimetic desire, which helps us understand the underlying drivers in conflict. But again, mimetic desire is not in scope.) Uncontrolled violence often resulted in the near annihilation of the whole community, and such violence became an obstacle for communities to develop into civilizations.
As Girard imagines it, a primitive community at some point finds itself in the familiar scenario of escalating tension again. Frustration grows. Violence escalates. Will this be another frenzy of violence, everyone turning on everyone else? The group is swept along as if by an unseen yet irresistible current. However, something unforeseen happens; at the very moment when the group is about to descend into uncontrolled and violent cathartic release, one of the community members points to another. The source of the frustration is suggested by this gesture. Violence finds a focus. A crowd converges upon a single victim. One dies instead of many.
Girard speculates how, when the blind passion subsides and the violence ceases, the chaotic noise makes way for a moment of silent attention. In this flicker of contemplation, everyone glimpses a symbol that overflows with meaning: the corpse of their victim: One that was in the community, is now out; yet this death means life for the remaining community. Chaos has been transformed into order by this dead body.
In Girard’s thought, the mimetic cycles and the scapegoating mechanism are not processes which humans invented but rather, the very processes that made us human. These evolutionary events transformed animals into humans by providing the possibility for complex symbolic thought and language. For Girard, the corpse of the Scapegoat corpse serves precisely as the kind of symbol that contains such an excess of meaning that it can serve as the catalyst for the emergence of the uniquely human, complex symbolic thought.[3]
The very possibility of meaning relies on the recognition of differences. Girard shows how the chaos that precedes the act of scapegoating violence represents a crisis of undifferentiation. At this stage of the crisis, rationality does not guide the frenzied mob; an irrational act of violence brings a cathartic end to the chaos. We have here a moment of possibility: a moment in which their irrational passions are satisfied, thereby creating room to consider the meaning of the moment. Mindless rage gives way to focused wonder. In no other event might opposites become as intense and obvious as in the corpse of the chosen victim. It symbolizes the death that brought life; the chaos that brought order; the violence that brought peace; the outcast and the community; the curse and the blessing; the demonic and the divine. I would suggest that maybe this was the first moment in which we vaguely heard the appeal of “the lamb slain from the foundation of the world” (Revelation 13:8), to our conscience. Or more precisely, the innocence of our victim created an opportunity for conscience, a sense of right and wrong, to emerge.
Within this series of events, in which an individual or a minority are murdered or expelled from a community, the chosen victims are incorrectly blamed for the chaos. And it is because of this aspect of the process that Girard chooses the word scapegoating in its modern usage of “to blame or persecute.” And he adds the term mechanism to it to emphasize the unconscious nature of this series of events.
Ritual and Myth
Please note that process, in this early iteration, cannot be called ritual. Girard give this early iteration a different name – the founding murder. Ritual and myth will develop from it. But the scapegoating mechanism is prior to ritual, prior to sacrifice, and serves as the foundation on which the great diversity of rituals and myths will be constructed. Why? Because the community will again face a crises and they will remember how the previous crisis was averted. For the effect and meaning of the scapegoating mechanism to continue, the community needs to remember the event. And the best way of remembering in a pre-literate age will be through re-enactment. Consequently ritual develops.
If there is a valid criticism of Girard, it might be in being too broad and universal. (We might look at that in another video.) But to say that he identified a particular kind of sacrifice with his concept of the scapegoating mechanism is simply a misunderstanding.
Girard’s ideas certainly have value for how we understand biblical ritual and sacrifice. But this value will be obscured if we try to artificially squeeze his ideas into pre-existing theological concepts. First understand Girard in his own right
Summarize the misunderstanding.
There are a few reasons for this common misunderstanding of Girard’s scapegoating mechanism. First, don’t assume that the term scapegoating has the same meaning across these different domains. In fact, just don’t get hung up on terminology – understand the underlying concept.
Second, understand the development of these concepts in their narrative sequence. A series of events that contributed to the evolution of hominids a few hundred thousand years ago do not directly map onto the Yom Kippur rituals. Some careful interpretation is necessary
Third, confusing the general with the particular is another common mistake.
Why do I think this is important to address? We all misunderstand things on a regular basis. That’s just part of the human adventure. Sometimes we go on and misrepresent the ideas of others, and that is a problem because it devalues the idea.
Girard’s ideas, if we engage with them deeply, have a great depth of value. And that’s why I think it’s worth bringing clarity to some of these misunderstood areas.
[1] Dawson, David. Flesh Becomes Word: A Lexicography of the Scapegoat or, the History of an Idea (Studies in Violence, Mimesis & Culture) (pp. xii-xiii). (Function). Kindle Edition.
[2] In his second book, Violence and the Sacred (1972), Girard analyzes classical origin myths showing that despite cultural differences, similar events gave birth to similar stories. One can see a definite shift in focus to anthropology in this work. The book received a positive review by G-H de Radkowski in Le Monde, heralding it as an “enormous intellectual achievement” and “the first truly atheistic theory of religion and of the sacred.”
[3] The philosopher Paul Dumouchel observes: “Girard’s elegant and original solution is to start from an undefined, exceedingly significant single symbol, which signifies precisely through the excess of significations that it contains.” Alison, The Palgrave Handbook of Mimetic Theory and Religion, 17.
